A revelation mechanism for shared conditional preferences in multi-attribute negotiation

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Proceedings titleThe Third International Workshop on Agent-based Complex Automated Negotiations (ACAN 2010)
ConferenceThe Third International Workshop on Agent-based Complex Automated Negotiations (ACAN 2010), May 10-14, 2010, Toronto, Ontario
Pages# of pages: 7
SubjectNegotiation mechanisms; Pareto efficiency; preferences; game theory
AbstractAgents who negotiate over a space of multi-attribute agreements where conditional preferences may be present can encounter difficulties in converging toward Pareto-efficient outcomes. This is because of the fact that, while both agents may have strategic incentives for keeping their own preferences private, there may be a number of attributes for which, under certain conditions, the two agents have the same preference. If they could work together to discover such instances, and agree to eliminate a portion of the space of agreements that both dislike, it would greatly increase the probability and speed of reaching a mutually favourable deal. We present a negotiation mechanism for agents to eliminate portions of the agreement space that are mutually non-beneficial. The mechanism enables the semi-truthful revelation of conditional preferences in such a way that encourages agents to make progress towards finding non-Pareto efficient outcomes. We demonstrate the protocol for such negotiations and outline the set of strategies that (1) agents have incentive to follow and (2) will result in mutually favourable elimination. We also empirically measure the effectiveness of such agreement space reduction in terms of utility achieved.
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AffiliationNational Research Council Canada (NRC-CNRC); NRC Institute for Information Technology
Peer reviewedNo
NRC numberPages 9-15
NPARC number16352303
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Record identifier1b1d0560-ed73-4408-8d78-27268604f414
Record created2010-11-10
Record modified2016-05-09
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